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BILLS AND NOTES-"OLDER IN DuE COURSE-INSTRUMENT MUST BE COMPLETE AND REVLAR ON ITS F.cE.-The plaintiff sued on two trade acceptances,
expressed as payable November ist and December ist. respectively, without
specifying the year. The defendant interposed a defense which would not
prevail against a holder in due course.
eIdd: The plaintiff was not a holder
in due course under the N. I. L, sec. 52: "A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1) that it is
complete and regular upon its face
."
United Railway & Logging
Supply Co. v. Siberian Commercial Co., 2oi Pac. 21 (Wash. 192M).
The only possible objection to an instrument such as the one in the instant case before the Negotiable Inst-ruments Law was the uncertainty as to
the due date, but in some cases this objection was removed by considering
it as payable on *demand. 'Collins v. Trotter ct al., 8i Mo. 275 (1883).
Silover on Regotiable Instruments, 2d Ed., p. 65. A dictum in Mount Calvary
Church v. Albers, 174 Mo. 331, 73 S. NV. 508 (i902), supports the theory
on which Collins v. Trotter ct al., supra, was decided. "In case no time or
an uncertain or impossible time is specified for the payment of a note, it is
understood to be payable on demand." A few courts, however, disposed of
such a problem by reasoning that it was intended to be payable at some time
after date and for this reason the jury should decide what time was intended; of course, parol evidence was not admissible to prove .the intention
of the parties. Conner et al., v. Routle, 7 Howard 176 (Miss. 1843) ; Nichols
v. Frothingham, 45 Me. 220 (x858).
The court in the principal case based its decision on the theory of in re
Estate of Philpott, 139 Ia. 555, 15i -N. W. 825 (z9z5), which seems to be
the only case decided squarely on this question under the Negotiable Instruments Law. On the other hand, in Torpey v. Tebo, 184 Mass. 3o7, 68
N. E. 223 (ixo3), a draft drawn, due October i, was held to be "an unconditional order to pay a sum certain in money, at a fixed future time" and a
negotiable bill of exchange under the N. I. J-, sec. 1. No question of
holder in due course being involved, sec. 52, id., under which the principal
case was decided, was not considered.
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is the only logical
view under the N. L L., sec. 52, for, as was said by the court, "where there
is an attempt to fix a due date which is not complete it would seem only
reasonable to hold that the instrument is one not complete and regular on
its face and the section of the statute requiring it to be such would prevail."
If, on the other hand, it is decided that a due date such as the one in the
principal case sets forth a "fixed future time," as was the case in Torpey
v. Tebo, supra, it seems it should be held that the instrument is complete
and therefore the holder is a holder in due course.

CAluums-Loss OF GOODS-CONSTattc
E DE.LivFRY.-A shipper left a bale
of cotton on defendant's railway platform without notifying defendant's
agent There was a notice posted that the defendant would not be liable for
(232)
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the loss of goods prior to the issuance of the bill of lading, but it was
the custom of the shipper to leave cotton on the platform at various times.
during the day and to obtain a bill of lading for .the whole amount in the
evening. The bale of cotton was stolen sometime during the day. Held:
The defendant was not liable. Behrmann v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co.,
io9 S. E. 397 (S. C. 1921).
A common carrier's liability for the loss of goods does not arise until
the goods are delivered to and accepted by the carrier. E. L & R. R. Ry.
Co. v. Hall, 64 Tex. 65 (1885); Tate v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co., 78 Miss.
842, 29 So. 392 (19oi). But there may be constructive delivery., If it is
the custom of a carrier to allow shippers of goods to leave them on the
platform without notifying the carrier, and the carrier later ships the goods
and gives them bills of lading whenever they call for them, the leaving
of the goods on the platform is a good delivery, and the carrier's liability
attaches from that time. Merriam v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry.. Co., 2o Conn.
354 (i85o); Meyer v. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Ry. Co., 41 La. Ann.
639, 6 So. 218 (1889); Washburn Crosby Co. v. Boston & Albany Ry. Co.,
18o Mass. 252, 62 N. . 590 (go2).
In the principal case, the court considers the case'of Copeland v. Ry., 76
S. C. 476, 57 S. E. 535 (19o6), which held the carrier liable under a similar
state of facts except that there was no notice posted. The court distinguishes
the cases on that ground, yet in the Copeland case the same court had approved of the doctrine of constructive delivery. They seem to think that
the admitted custom of the shipper in leaving goods on the platform and the
acquiescence in this by the defendant in the instant case does not constitute a
waiver of the notice.
Thus it Would seem in view of the Copeland case, supra, and the principal case, that by posting such a notice, a carrier may avoid liability for the
loss of goods delivered in this manner, even though it acquiesces in such
deliveries in apparent disregard of such notice.
CRimiNAL LAW-CRUELTY To AriMALs--MIsnaML-NO-NO-.IDrCrAm.

OFmFNSE-A statute defined cruelty to animals as. a misdemeanor and provided
for summary conviction for it' violation. The defendant claimed the right
to trial by jury. Held: Trial by jury'denied. The offense was not a crime
at common law and a statute does not make cruelty to animals An.indictable
offense by defining it as a misdemeanor. Allen v. Commonwealth,. 77 Pa.
Super. 244 (ig92).

At common law, generally, animals had no rights and cruelty to them
was not punishable criminally. Waters v. People, 23 Colo. 33, 46 Pac. n12
(1896); State v. Bruner, In Ind. 98, 12 N. E. io3 (1887). Intent to injure
an owner by cruelty to his animal subjected the wrongdoer to an indictment
for malicious mischief, Cranch. v. State, 41 Tex. 622 (1874); and cruelty

amounting to a nuisance was indictable as such. U. S. v. Jackson, 4 Cranch.
483 (U. S. C. C. 1834); U. S. v. Logan, 2 Cranch 259 (U. S. C. C. 82z);
A few courts extended this last view and made the offense of cruelty to
animals indictable as a misdemeanor. Isaac Ross' Case, 3 City Hall Rec.
191 (N. Y. i88) ; State v. Briggs, i Aiken 226 (Vt 1826).
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Misdemeanor is a term used for all crimes less than a felony, 4 Bl.
Com. 5; 3 Burns Inst. 557, but all crimes were not indictable at common
law. People v. Van Houten, 13 Misc. 6o3, 35 N. Y. S. 186 (1895). Some
courts hold, however, that an essential characteristic of a misdemeanor is
that it should be an indictable offense, State v. Hunter, 67 Ala. 8z (i88o);
others that when the legislature declares that an act is a misdemeanor it
states in effect that such an act is an indictable offense, Son v. People, 12
Wend. 344. (1834) ; and it has also been stated that a misdemeanor does not
include a multitude of offenses over which magistrates have an exclusive
summary jurisdiction. 2 Bouv. Law Dict.
Differences in constitutional provisions cause a lack of uniformity in
the decisions regarding the right to trial by jury. There are decisions to
the effect that the legislature may deny the right for any newly created
offense. Tims v. State, _6 Ala. 165 (i855); Comm. v. Andrews, 211 Pa.
11i, 6o At. 554 (igoS). This doctrine is generally disapproved. Ex parte
Wong You Ting, io6 Cal. 296, 39 Pac. 627 (1895). The better rule seems
to be that an offense unknown before the adoption of a constitution is
triable by jury or not according to its status as naturally falling within a
class of offenses that were or were not theretofore so tied, McInerney v.
Denver, 17 Colo. 302, -9 Pac. 516 (1892) ; and that the right should not be
determined by the punishment or description of the offense. Callon v. Wilson,
x27 U. S. 54, 32 L. ed. 223 (1887).
The principal case is in accord with the Pennsylvania rule that the
legislature may determine the procedure in any newly created offense, Comm.
v. Andrews, supra, but the rule seems to be widely disapproved and it does
seem that some limit should be observed so that punishments of a grave
character cannot be pr'escribed with a denial of the right to trial by jury.
CRimiKAL LAw-LoST TRANscRiPr-NEW TRIAL D-NiED.-Appellants were
convicted of rape and appealed. By statute they were entitled to a transcript of the court reporter. The reporter died before the notes were transcribed. A clerk's transcript was furnished by order of the court. Held:
New trial denied. State v. Ricks, 2o1 Pac. 827 (Idaho 1921).
In some jurisdictions it is held that the Supreme Court has power to
grant a new trial in the exercise of its original jurisdiction where a party
has lost the benefit of a bill of exceptions through no fault of his own.
Borrowscale v. Bosworth, 98 Mass. 34 (I867); State v. Reed, 67 Mo. 36
(1877); Bailey v. U. S., 3 Okl. Cr. i75, io4 Pac. 917 (iog). In England,
under Statute r3 Edward I, a new trial may be granted under such circumIn
stances. Newton v. Boodle, 3 Com. B. 795, 136 Eng. Reprint 318 (847).
a former trial of the principal case, however, the Idaho supreme court held
it had no such power in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. State v.
Ricks, 32 Idaho 232, i8o Pac. 257 (919).
Whether or not the supreme court can and should grant a new trial
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was the question in the principal
case. The decision of the majority of the court, that it had no such power,
is upheld in a number of states. Alley v. McCabe, 147 Ill. 410, 35 N. E. 6r5
(1893) ; Etchells v. Wainwright, 76 Conn. 534, 57 At. 121 (1904); Stenog-
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rapher Cases, 100 Me. 27r, 6I Atl. 782 (1905); Peterson v. Lundquist, ro6
Minn. 339, 119 N. W. so (i9o8); People v. Botkin, 9 Cal. App. 244, 98 Pac.
861 ('o);

Dumbarton Realty Co. v. Erickson, 143 Iowa 6y'7,

2o N. W.

1025 (1cno9).

In the case of Richardson v. State, i5 Wyo. 465, F9 Pac. 1o27 (9o7),
it was held that the supreme court had the power to grant a new trial in

the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under such circumstatices as exist
in the principal case. This view was adopted by the dissenting justices in
the principal case and is supported by many cases. People ex rel. Wright
v. Judge of Superior Court of Detroit, 4r Mich. 726, 49 N. W. 925 (1879);
Sanders v. Norris, 82 N. C. 243 (i88o); Tegler v. State, 3 OkL Cr. 595, 1o7
Pac. 9L49 (19io).
The majority of the court in the principal case hold, with respect to
Art. 5, sec. 13 of the Idaho Constitution (which gives the supreme court
original jurisdiction to issue any writ necessary .to The exercise of its appellate jurisdiction), that this does not impliedly give the power to reverse
the judgment and grant a new trial when the method of supplying the record,
provided by statute, is ineffective. This view opposes that of the Wyoming
Court in Richardson v. State, supra, where it was held that such power was
incidental to the power to compel a correct record to be sent up. The latter
view was adopted by the minority in the principal case.
According to Art. 5, sec. 9 of the Idaho Constitution and C. S. 9o86 the
appellate power is to "review
.
and to reverse, affirm or
modify . . . and may, if proper, order a new triaL" The majority
of the court said that this section implied that error must be committed by
the court below and unless error were shown, there was nothing calling for the
exercise of the power to reverse the judgment on appeal
The view of the majority of the court, considering the fact that a
clerk's transcript was available, commends itself to reason and seems
thoroughly sound.
CONFLICr OF LAWS--STATuTE oF FRAUDS- LEx Loc C0NTRACrUS,--lailntiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, made an oral contract to sell sugar, valued
at about $3000 to defendant, a Delaware corporation. The contract was made
and to be performed in Pennsylvania. Defendant failed to perform and the

plaintiff sued in Delaware. Defendant pleaded the Pennsylvania Sales Act
and plaintiff demurred generally. Held: Plaintiff cannot recover. Sec. 4,
Pennsylvania Sales Act, Act of May 19, 1915, P. L s4, relates to the validity'
of the contract and therefore the lex loci contractusgoverns. Franklin Sugar
Refining Co. v. Holstein Harvey's Sons, Inc., 27s Fed. 622 (D. C. ipx9).
This construction is in accord with the weight of authority of. the
courts in construing statutes of frauds and represents that adopted by the
Pennsylvania courts. Manufacturer's Light & Heat Co. v. Lamp et aL, 269
* Pa. 517, 112 At. 6-9 0921).; Mason-Heflin Coal Co. v. Currie et al., 27p Pa.221, 113 AtL 2w (19z).
However, in those states where the statute provides "no action shall be
brought

.

.," there has been a marked difference of opinion as

to whether the. statute goes to the validity of the contract or merely to the
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remedy. If it affects the validity, it is generally held that the lex loci contrartus governs. Murdock v. Calgary Colonization Co., 193 Ill.App. 295
(1916); 'Matson v. Bauman, 139 Minn. 396, 166 N. V. 343 (918).
Whereas
if it is interpreted as a matter of procedure, the lex fori governs. Third
National Bank of New York v. Steel. 129 Mfich. 434, 88 N. W. io'5o (z9o2);
Boone e aL v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 154 S. W. 900 (1913) ; Barbour v. Campbell,
ioi Kan. 676, i68 Pac. 879 (1917).
The English Statute of Frauds (29 Car. I, c.3), from which are patterned
practically all our statutes of frauds, has given rise to a distinction based
upon the different wording of two sections therein. Sec. 4 reads, "No action
shall be brought
"
Sec. 17 reads, "No contract shall be allowed
to be good.
.
"
In Leron v. Brown, I C. B. 8oi (Eng. 1852),
construing sec. 4, the court held that it related to the remedy and therefore
the lcx fori applied, but they said fhat sec. 17 was clearly not equivalent to

sec. ,,since the contract was valid and enforceable in Fraice where itwas
made.
This distinction has been upheld in Connecticut, Kentucky and Michigan
where the same construction prevails. Downer v. Cheesebrough, 36 Conn.
39 (i869) ; Third National Bank of New York v. Steel, s'upra.
In Arkansas, Indiana, Illinois, Tennessee and Pennsylvania, 'the distinction has been ignored and it is held that such language as appears in the
two sections of the English statute, supra, is intended to. affect the validity
of the contract. Ringgold v. Newkirk, 3 Ark. 96 (i84o) ; Anderson v. May,
io Heisk. 84 (Tenn. 1872); Cochran v. Ward, 5 Ind. App. 89, 29 N. E.
795 (1892) ; Miller v. Wilson, 146 11. 523, 34 N. - iii (z893).
In view of the language of the Pennsylvania statute ("
shall not be enforceable

.

.

"),the construction by the Pennsylvania

courts, adopted in the instant case, leaves no room for doubt that they deem
it desirable that any contract not within its terms be invalid.
DAMAGES-JUDICIAL NOTICE-IMPAIRED PURCHASING PowER OF DOLLA
In an action for damages the counsel for the plaintiff argued that in as-

sessing damages the jury should consider the impaired purchasing power of
the dollar. The court instructed that, without evidence regarding it, it
might be considered by the. jury. Held: It was proper so to instruct the
jury, at least so far as pecuniary losses such as the loss of time, loss of
earning power, expense and the like are concerned. Holloran v. New England Telegraph & Telephone Co., irS Atl. 143 (Vt. ig2i).
The object of damages is to award a fair compensation for the injuries
received. It is generally known that the purchasing power of the dollar
varies, and itis competent for a jury to consider such a condition, in arriving at a fair amount of compensation for the injuries sustained. Washington & R. Ry. Co. v. LaFourcade, 48 D. of C. App. Cas. 364 (ig1g); Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Scott's Adm'r's., 188 Ky. 99, 22o S. W. io66 (i92o).
In comparing present and past verdicts judicial notice has been taken of
the well-known decreased purchasing power of the dollar in deciding whether
a verdict was excessive. Hurst v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co., 280 Mo. 566,
219 S. W. 566 (i92o); Melish v. 'New York Consol. Ry. Co. 178 N. Y. S.
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2- 8 (1919). And where on second trial the lower court refused to reduce
a verdict to the amount to which it reduced the first verdict, it was decided
that this was not an abuse of discretion, because in the intervening period
economic conditions had reduced the purchasing power of the dollar.
Phila. & R. Ry. Co. v. McNibbin, 259 Fed. 476, 170 C. C. A. 452 (1919).
When economic conditions were reversed, judicial notice was taken of the
increased purchasing power of the dollar in deciding whether a verdict
was excessive. Johnson v. St. Paul City Ry., 67 Minn. _6o, 69 N. NV. goo,

(1897).
Judicial notice has been takep of the well-known increase in the cost
of living where a petition for an increase in the allowance for the maintenance of a minor was being heard. In re Wilmer, 131 Md. 29,-111 At.
ij8 (9--o) ; likewise where the petition was for an increase in the amount
of alimony, McCaddin v. McCaddin, i6 Md. 567, 82 AtL. 554 (1gx1) ; and the
decreased purchasing power of the dollar in the real estate market was
judicially noticed as a ground for refusing specific performance of a contract for the sale of land. Schefrin v. Wilensky, xII Adt. 66o (N. J. 192o).
The instruction in the principal case allows the jury to consider a fact
of which the courts have universally taken judicial notice. This fact should
be considered to make the verdict a fair compensation for the injury sustained; and the objection, in the minority opinion, that it gives the jury a
too wide field of conjecture seems a remote danger.
DxvoacE-Naw TRIAL GRANTED AFTER DEATH oF LiBnrANT.-The respondent in a divorce suit petitioned for a new trial but before a hearing was
had the libelant died. Held: A new trial will be granted notwithstanding the
death of the libelant since property rights are involved. Tarbox v. Tarbox,
115 Atl. 164 (Me. 192i).
The general rule is that if the property rights of the survivor are
affected by the decree of divorce, the decree itself may be assailed, if it is
for any reason void or voidable. Fidelity Ins. Co.'s Appeal, 93 Pa. 242
(i88o) ; Wood v. Wood, 136 Ia. 128, 113 N. V. 492 (igo7) ; Gato v. Christian,
112 Me. 426, 92 AtI. 489 (1914). The administrators and the heirs of the
deceased and all those whose property rights might be affected are often
held to be necessary parties in such an action. Rawlins v. Rawlins, x8 Fla.
345 (i881); Groh v. Groh, 35 N. Y. Misc. 354 (i9oi). If, however, there
are no property rights involved the decree will generally be considered
immutable. "Barney v. Barney, 14 Ia. z89 (1862); Kirschner v. Dietrich,
rio Cal. 5o3, 42 Pac. io64 (0895). One case has been found which decides
that the question of property rights need not be investigated before the
decree can be annulled. Brown c al. v. Grove, n16 Ind. 84, z8 N. E. 387

(7888).
Missouri and Washington seem to be the only two jurisdictions in which
the decisions are squarely contra td the general rule, as set forth in .the
principal case. In Dwyer v. Nolan, 40 Wash. 459, 82 Pac. 746 (49o5), the
court reasoned that since death terminates the marriage relation, there are
no proper parties to a motion to vacate the decree and therefore the question of divorce cannot be relitigated. In Lieber v. Lieber, 239 Mo. 1, 143
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S. W. 438 (1912), the court came to the same conclusion-"A judgment in a
divorce suit is one in'rei. That judgment in rem or dissolved relationship
would not descend to the heirs, nor would it pass into the hands of his
executor or administrator. Consequently there could be no such person or
thing represented in any such suit after one of the parties thereto has
died." There is a dictum in Owens v. Sims, 3 Coldw. 544 (Tenn. 1866) which
supports this conclusion but the case was decided on a statute, and therefore
it cannot be said as a certainty that the Tennessee courts would follow the
minority rule.
A divorce suit is generally classified as one in equity, Nelson on Divorce
& Separation, Vol. x, sec. 6, and for this reason equitable principles should be
applied. Jt is submitted that it would be inequitable, to say the least, if
the respondent would be precluded from assailing the decree when his or
her property rights are involved.
LIBEL.j-DEFAMATORY

STATEMENTS ABOUT

A DECEASED

RELATi_.-In

an

action for libel the plaintiff seeks to recover damages for 'her mental
suffering and distress caused by the libel of her deceased brother. The
libel was that plaintiff's deceased brother was illegitimate. Held: Tliere is
no cause of action. The libelous statement injured the reputation of the
deceased, and the right of action lay in the deceased alone. Such a libelous
statement causes mental distress to all the relatives and even friends of the
deceased and to allow this plaintiff to recover would be to recognize a right
of actiori in all the friends and relatives of the deceased. Saucer et us. v.
Giroux, 2o2 Pac. 887 (Calif. 1922).
The libel of a dead person is a misdemeanor at common law, if it is
alleged that it was done with intent to bring his family into contempt, P. v.
Critchley, 4 T. R. 129 (Eng. 1734) ; R. v. Topham, 4 T. R. x26 (Eng. x79x);
but not if the injury is only to deceased's character and brings no contempt
on his family. R. v. Ensor, 3 Times L R. 366 (Eng. 1886). A parent
cannot recover for injured feelings caused by libel of a deceased child, where
the parent's reputation is not affected. The parent's injured feelings are
the same whether the child be dead or alive, and the parent cannot sue for
the libel of a living child, nor as the representative of the deceased, since
the injury of the reputation of the deceased did not injure his estate.
Bradt v. New Nonpareil Co., 108 Iowa 449, 79 N. WV. r22 (i89); Sorensen
v. Balaban, ii App. Div. 164, 42 N. Y. 654 (1896). A defamatory statement
made to the child alone might cause similar mental suffering but does not
give any cause of action because there is no injury to reputation. Sorensen
v. Balaban, supra. A defamatory statement that a husband died as a result
of suicide does not give the wife a right of action. An aspersion on a
deceased person cannot give anyone else the right to recover for the wrong
done the deceased, and there is no authority which allows a wife to bring
an action to recover for her injured feelings. Broome v. Ritchie, 6 Sess.
Cas. W4 (Scot. i904). The mental distress caused by the libel of a deceased
relative cannot be the basis of a civil action. Wellman v. Sun Printing &
Publ. Assn., 66 Hun. 331 (N. Y. 1892); Sprocki v. Stahl, 14 Cal. App. i, no
Pac: 957 (1910).

RECENT CASES
It would seem clear that the plaintiff in the principal case cannot recover
for her mental suffering and distress, but in all the cases cited above, the
defamatory statement referred to some wrongful act of the deceased, while
;n the principal case the defamatory statement tends to cast a reflection
upon the deceased's family. As a consequence it would seem possible
that the plaintiff's own reputation may have been injured. Two-persons
may be so related that an accusation against one necessarily affects the
personal character of another. Vicars v. "Worth, x Strange 471 (Eng.
1722); Hodgkins v. Corbet, i Strange

55 (Eng. 1723).

Where the plain-

tiff's sister was falsely accused of committing larceny, the plaintiff was
allowed to reco ver, the court saying that to write that the plaintiff is the
brother of the sister arrested, for larceny may well be considered by a
jury to impair his standing in the community. Merrill v. Post Publ. Co., 197
Mass. x85, 83 N. E. 419 (1o8). In that case, the plaintiff's name was
mentioned in the libel, but there was no direct defamation of the plaintiff's
character.
Applying the above authorities to the facts of the principal case, the
plaintiff may hav.e a right of action for injury to her-own reputation. The
plaintiff did not base her action on this ground, however, and consequently
the decision is in accord with the great weight of decided cases.
MORI'GAGES-RIGHT OF REDE1MTION-STATUTE OF LImiTATI0sThe plaintiffs claim right to certain property through one E. T. Tate, .who had
executed a mortgage thereon for the benefit of the defendant, the terms
of which provided that if there should be a default in the payment of the
debt by a certain date the mortgagee should enter under clear title. Plaintiffs
bring an action, as heirs of E. T. Tate, to obtain the property and also
have defendant account for rents, profits, etc. Held" The instrument executed
by E. T. Tate was a mortgage and not a deed and the defendant could
take no title thereby. The plaintiffs should therefore be allowed to recover
the property. Frady v. Ivester, iio S. E. 135 (N. C. i92.).
The general rule is that the mortgagor or those claiming under him
may bring a bill in equity to redeem property in the possession of the
mortgagee, praying at the same time for an account of the rents, profits,
etc., which accrued while the mortgagee was in possession. Horn v. Indianapolis National Bank, 125 Ind. 381, 25 N. E. 558 (i89o); Beekmnan v.
Frost. 18 Johns 544 (N. Y. 182o). Most states have statutes fixing the time
within which an action to redeem must be brought or else the right will
be lost. Lindberg v. Thomas, 137 Ia. 48, 114 N. W. 56z (igoS); Hughes v.
Edwards, 9 Wheaton 488 (U. S. 1824); McNair v. Lot, 34 Mo. 285 (1863).
The period is usually twenty years, Hughes v. Edwards, supra, although in
some states it is less. Mahaffy v. Faris, z44 Ia. 22o, i2 N. W. 934 (igog).
But even in the absence of any statutes it has been held that since the right
to redeem is of equitable cognizance, it might be lost through laches.
Deadman v. Yantis, 230 Ill. 243, 82 N. E. 592 (1907).
In the principal case the mortgagee had.been in possession without
giving any rents or profits for over twenty years. The court, however, was
of the opinion that the said mortgagee was not. holding adversely to the
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mortgagor's interest on account of the agreement in the mortgage giving

the mortgagee the possession on the mortgagor's default. In their view
the mortgagee was holding in subordination to and with the permission
of the mortgagor, and hence was not holding adversely. It is submitted
that by the very terms of the mortgage the mortgagee was to hold adversely
in case of default in payment by the mortgagor. If this is the proper construction, and a very vigorous dissenting opinion takes this view, it would
seem then that the statutory period had run against the plaintiff's claim
for redemption.
NEGLIGEE-ExPLoSIVES-PRoxI.MAT

CAUSE-INFANT TRESPAssER.

-The

plaintiff's thirteen-year-old son, while playing on the defendant's lot, where
boys were. accustomed to play, found dynamite caps in a wooden box. Four
days later he took the caps to the home of his grandmother, sixty miles away
and in another state, where he was killed the following day by the explosion
of one of the caps, out of which he had tried to pry the explosive substance
with a hat pin. Held: The defendant is liable for the death of the plaintiff's
son. O'Brien v. Fred Kroner Hardware Co., s85 N. W. 2o5 (Wis. xi2i).
It is a general rule that a landowner owes no duty to trespassers except
the duty not wilfully or intentionally to inflict injury upon them. Reardon
v. Thompson, 149 Mass. 267, 2! N. E. 369 (1889) ; Schmidt v. Bauer, 8o Cal.
565, 2; Pac. 256 (z889); Thompson on Negligence, Vol. I, p. 303. To infant
trespassers, however, some courts hold that he does owe a duty of care and
must protect them from dangerous instruments, particularly those attractive
to their natural instincts of play. Sioux City, etc. R- Co. v. Stout, 17
Wall. 657, 21 L ed. 745 (U. S. 1873) ; Keffe v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 21
Minn. 207 (1875);, Edgington v. Burlington, etc R. Co., 116 Ia. 410, 9o N.
IV. 95 (i9O2).
This is the so-called "doctrine of the Turntable Cases," a
doctrine that has been criticized by some courts and openly repudiated by
others, Frost v. Eastern R. R. Co., 64 N. H. 220, 9 AtI. 790 (1886); Daniels
v. New York & New England R. R. Co., 154 Mass. 349, 28 N. E. 283 (z89i) ;
Ryan v. Towar, 128 Mich. 463, 8Y N. W. 644 (191) ; and which has been
confined by a few courts to the field of its original application, i. e., to railroad turntables. Mergenthaler v. Kirby, 79 Md. 182, 28 Atl. io65 (1894);
Smith v. Dold Packing Co., 82 Mo. App. 9 (1899); Harris v. Cowles, 38
Wash. 331, 80 Pac. 537 (1o5).
Other courts, however, have extended-this "turntable doctrine" to classes
of dangerous instruments other than turntables, and so the leaving of explosives accessible to children has been held to be negligence. Mattson
v. Minnesota, etc, R. Co., 95 Minn. 47Y, io4 N. W. 443 ('9o5); Olson v.
Gill Home Investment Co., 58 Wash. 151, oS Pac. 14o (xgio); FolsomMorris Coal Min. Co. v. De Vork, 6i Okl. 75, i6o Pac. 64 (rgi6).
Although few courts clearly state it, such negligence, nevertheless,
must be shown to be the proximate cause of the injury complained of in
order to hold the defendant liable. The principal case holds the defendant's
negligence to be the proximate cause in spite of the act of the boy in exploding the cap and in spite of the time and space that intervened between
the taking of the explosive and tie explosion itself.
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Some courts hold that the act of a child in exploding a dynamite cap,
or torpedo breaks the chain of causation between the negligence and the
injury, Afflick v. Bates, 21 R. I. 281, 43 Ati. 539 (1889) ; Horan v. Watertown,
217 Mass. 185, io4 N. E. 464 (914); Hale v. Pacific TeL, etc, Co., 42 Cal.
App. 55, x83 Pac. 280 (xgio) ; but the majority rule is that the causal connection remains unbroken by the intervening act of the child. Harriman v.
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., 45 Ohio St. ii, i N. E. 451 (1887) ; Makin v. Piggott,
29 Can. S. C. 188 (1898) ; .Nelson v. McLellan, 31 Wash. 208, 71 Pa. 747:
(r903).
There have been cases, too, where the. defendant hsi- bten-.held.not;'
liable because considerable time had elapsed between the. asportation off
the explosive and the injury, Carpenter- v. Miller, 232 Pa. 362, 8x Att 439
(1g1) ; Jacobs v. New York, etc., R. Co., 212 Mass. 96, 98 N. E. 688"(x912);
Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 219 N. Y. 6o, 113 N. E. s29 (ig96), but other
cases -sustain the view that the mere intervention of time will not render
the cause remote. Akin v. Bradley Engineering & M. Co., 48 Wash. 97,
92 Pac. 9o3 -(i9o7) ; Eckart v. Kid, 123 Minn. ix4, r43 N. W. I:a-(*9l3;
Barnett v. Cliffside Mills, 167 N. C. 56, 83 S. F. 826 (1914).
There seems to be no case, however, in which the explosive has been
carried away for a great distance and then exploded by the child. In most
of the cases, the explosion of the dynamite caps or torpedoes has taken place
reasonably near to the defendant's premises. There appears to be no logical
reason, however, why the defendant in the principal- case should not be
held liable, even if the explosion happened sixty miles distant, and in another
state, as long as it was a consequence which .he as a prudent man should
reasonably have anticipated.
So, the principal case, decided by a court which has recognized the
liberal application of the "turntable doctrine" in Brinilson v. C. & N.W. R. Co.,
144 Wis. 614, 129 N. W. 664 (igiz); Meyer v. Menominee & M. L C. T.
Co., 151 Wis. 279, 138 N. W. xoo8 (1912); Herrem v. Konz, i65 Wis- 574,
162 N. W. 654 (1917); shows no departure from the existing law..
-NwucnGENC-INJURI.S TO CHELDIx-A mcxvn NUISANcES."-Tho
motorman left one of defendant's cars standing in the street with its.
trolley pole tied -down to the top of the car, the switch at both ends of the
car turned off, the brakes set, the doors locked, and he carried away the
controller. It was in a neighborhood where children were accustomed to
play in the street. Children broke into the car and started it with an
improvised controller. The plaintiff, a boy of three, was crushed between
the car, on which he and the other children were riding, and another car
on the same track.. Held: The plaintiff cannot recover, as the defendant
took proper ,precautions to prevent children from moving the car and injuring themselves. Kressine v. Janesville Traction Co., 184 N. W. 777. (Wis.
1921).

The
instance
but the
v. Sioux

doctrine of attractilve nuisance seems to have, arisen in the firstin the English case of Lynch v. Nurden, r Q. B. 29 (Eng. 1841);
doctrine was not taken up in the Ufnited States until 18"3. Stout
City & P. R..Co., 17 Wall 657 (U. S.1873).. The last named case
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was the first of the so-called "turntable cases." In that case it was decided
that the railroad company was negligent in not keeping its turntable locked
when children were known to be in the habit of playing about it. Many
states adopted the rule as laid down by the United States Supreme Court
in Stout v. Sioux City, etc., R. Co., supra. O'Malley v. St. P., etc., R. Co.,
43 Minn. 289, 45 N. W. 440 (189o); Barrett v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 91
Calif. 296, 27 Pac. 666 (1891). The cases that adopt the principle rely
for the most part on the theory that there is an implied invitation to the
child due to the attraction of the machine. Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Fox,
38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. E. 81 (19o4). A number of jurisdictions refused to
adopt the turntable doctrine on the ground that the railroad company
owed no duty to a trespasser except to protect him from active violence;
and refused to regard children of tender years as a privileged class.
Walsh v. Fitchburg R. Co., 145 N. Y. 30i, 39 N. E. io68 (1895); Thompson
v. R_ R., 218 Pa. 444, 67 Atl. 768 (i907). It is a peculiar coincidence that
many states which approved of the principle as laid down in Stout v. R.
R., supra, have limited the liability to cases related very closely to the
turntable cases, while states that refused to adopt the rule as applied to
turntables have been more liberal in applying the same rule to facts tiat
are almost identical to the turntable cases. Thus many courts refused
to extend' the turntable doctrine to cases where the attractive object is
one which has nothing to do with a child's love of motion, Erickson v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 82 Minn. 6o, 84 N. W. 462 (i9o); Etheredge
v. Central R. Co., 122 Ga. 853, 50 S. E. oo3 (i9o5). Pennsylvania has
never adopted the attractive nuisance doctrine in respect to turntables,
but gives infant trespassers very liberal protection when playing in other
dangerous places. Carr v. So. Traction Co., 253 Pa. 274, 98 At1. 554
(i9i6). Almost every jurisdictiun refuses to regard standing cars as attractive nuisances, even though they are unbraked on a track near where
children are known to play. Buddy v. Union Terminal Ry. Co., 276 Mo.
App. 315
276, 2o7 S. W. 821 (igi8); Colby v. Chi. June. Ry. Co., 216 Ill.
(ig2o). The California Supreme Court, on the other hand, allowed a boy
of twelve to recover when he was injured while pushing an unbraked handcar. Cahill v. Stone & Co., 153 Cal. 57I, 96 Pac. 84 (igog). The latter
case seems to stand alone in its extension of the rule of attractive nuisances
to cars left standing unbraked on the track. The principal case seems to be
in accord with the weight of authority, and it would be going far indeed
to say that the defendant had not taken all the reasonable steps to prevent
the injury which occurred.
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF LANDOWNER FOR NEGLIGENT AcTs INJURING
TRAVELER oN HIGHWAY.-The defendant company owned a lot adjoining a

highway, and permitted its employees to play ball there during the noon
hour. The plaintiff, an employee of the company, was struck in the back
by a batted ball as she was returning to her work along the adjoining!.
highway. Held: The plaintiff cannot recover, as the defendant was not
negligent in allowing its employees to play ball. Harrington v. Border City
Mfg. Co., 132 S. F. 721 (Mass. 1921)."
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.
The owner of land can only use his property in such a way as not
to infringe upon the rights of anyone to whom he owes a duty. -Thus an
occupant of premises adjoining a highway owes a duty to pedestrians to
use his premises in such a manner as not to expose unreasonably such a
traveller to unsafe conditions. The traveling public has a right to -make
free use of a highway, which right the abutting owner must safeguard
by maintaining the structures upon his land in safe condition, and by a
reasonable use thereof. Goodin v. Fuson, 22 Ky. 873, 60 S. NV. 293 (I9OO);
Sorrero v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 N. J. L 642, 92 Adt. 604 (1914); The courts
will never presume that there has been negligence from the mere fact that
an injury has been received, but an injury may occur under such circumstances that the courts are justified in making "an inference or presumption of negligence." Thus one in possession and control of buildings past
which travellers must walk, is under a duty to exercise care to prevent
articles from falling upon passers-by. .Stair v. Kane, 156 Fed. ioo (C. C.
.V 531 (igog).
i9o7); Bannigan v. Woodbury 158 Mich. 206, i2 N.
Whether there has been negligence in the use of land is usually a question
for the jury, and this involves an interpretation of the facts in each
particular case. Wolf v. Des Moines, 126 Iowa 659, 1o2 N. W. 517 ('905);
Roth Packing Co. v. Williams, 3 Ohio App. 348 (1914).
The tendency of the later cases is to enforce a strict degree of care
upon the owner of property in respect to persons upon the public highway, or on adjacent land. The court in the principal case, however,
refused to apply the rule of Stair v. Kane, supra. It is submitted that the
use of the land in the principal was in the nature of a nuisance. Pedestrians were under constant danger of being struck by a batted ball, and
the defendant did nothing'to avert the danger. If one permits his land
to be used for such purposes he should be required to take positive
measures to protect passers-by, and a failure to do so should in the event
of resulting injury make him liable in an action for damages.
NEw TRIAL-INcOMPETENCE OF ATTORNEY.-Because of his ignorance,
counsel for the defendant was unable to impeach the state's evidence.
Held: In view of the -fact that the state's evidence was inconclusive; a new
trial was granted because of counsel's ignorance. People v. Schulman, i32
i921).
N. E. 530 (Ill.
The decision in the principal case is contrary to the strict rule that
a person free to choose his own attorney must take the consequences of
that attorney's want of skill or learning. State v. Dreher, 137 Mo. Hr, 38
S. W. 567 (1897); Edwards v. Territory, 8 Ariz. 342, 76 Pac. 458 (19o4);
People v. Barnes, 27o Il1. 574, io N. E. 881 (1915). A blind adherence to
this rule would in many criminal cases lead to harsh injustice and, therefore, not desiring deliberately to sacrifice life or liberty most courts qualify
the rule. They hold that a new trial will not be granted unless it is
shown that the defendant has been vitally prejudiced. Comm. v. Benesh,
Thach. Crim. Cases 688 (Mass. 1842); State v. Benge, 6i Iowa 658, x
N. IV. 100 (1883) ; Hudson v. State, 76 Ga. 727 (1886). So great, however,
must the prejudice be that courts have found counsel's mere intoxication
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or insanity insufficient. O'Brien v. Comm. iiS Ky. 6o8, 74 S. W. 666
(19o3); State v. 3ethune, 93 S. C. 195, 75 S. E. 281 (1912). Cases in
which the prejudice done to the defendant's case has been found sufficient
are very few. A new trial was granted in State v. Jones, 12 Mo. App.
93 (1882), which was strongly disapproved of in State v. Dreher, supra.

In civil cases because of the absence of any conscientious scruples concerning human life and liberty the rule is more strictly enforced against
the appellant and there are very few implications that any exceptions are
possible. The feeling is that since only property is involved the owner
is bound by the conduct of those whom he employs to take care of it.
Jones v. Leech, 46 Iowa i86 (1877) ; De Florey v. Raynolds, i6 Blatchf.
397 (U. S. C. C. 1879); In re Quinn's Estate, 5 N. Y. S. 261 (1889);
Malry v. Grant, 48 S. W. 614 (Texas 1898).
In England, however, where counsel was negligently absent a new trial
was granted upon payment of the costs of the former trial. De Roufigny v.
Peale, 3 Taunt. 484 (Eng. i8ui); Fourdrinier v. Bradbury, 3 B. & Aid.
328 (Eng. i82o). There was also an exception to the general rule in Kimball
Co. v. Huntington, 8o Wis. 270, 5o N. NV. 177 (i89i) which allowed a new
trial because of counsel's negligence.
The strict rule appears to be a necessary one for practical reasons.
As pointed out in Jones v. Leech, supra, it would be very unsatisfactory
for the courts to be compelled to adjudicate upon the skill and learning
of attorneys. In that case the court stated that by forcing the responsibility upon the client and thus encouraging a careful choice of counsel
the client's interests will be better protected and the more learned members of the profession will be rewarded.
The principal case seems to be one of the few in which the court
was compelled to say that the defendant was essentially prejudiced and
finding so it took the more liberal view and granted a new trial. However, in view of the decision in People v. Barnes, supra, it seems to have
departed from precedent in the particular jurisdiction.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-PAROL CONTRACT FOR LAND--STATUTE OF FRAUDS:

-Plaintiff sues her sister's administrator for the specific performance of
a parol contract by which the sister promised to leave plaintiff her homestead, if the latter would come to live with her and care for her. Held:
The plaintiff was entitled to specific performance. Colby v. Street, 185 N. W.
9S4 (Minn. 1921).
The weight of authority is in accord with this decision, the majority

rule being, that a parol contract for the sale of land or to leave it by will
is taken out of the statute of frauds by performance by the promisee, if
the services rendered are of such a personal character that it is impossible
to estimate their value by any pecuniary standard, and if the promisee
cannot be restored to his foimer situation or compensated in damages.
Hinkle v. Hinkle, s5 Ark. 583,18 S. XV. 1049 (r892); Brinton v.
8 Utah 480, 33 Pac. 218 (1893) ; Hall v. Harris, 145 Mo. 6r4,
506 (i9o8). Other cases grant specific performance where there
such performance by the promisee that it would be fraud on him

Van Cott,
47 S. W.
has been
if it were
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-not granted. Vreeland v. Vreeland, j3 N. J. Eq. 387 (1895); McCabe v.
Healy, 138 Cal. 8z, 7o Pac. ioo8 (i9o2).
The minority view is that the plaintiff must enter into possession of
the land in reliance on the contract, and that the rendering of services and
change of position by him is not enough. In Grant v. Grant, 63 Conn.
530, 29 At. 15 (i893), a girl went to live with a man and his wife on an
oral promise that she would be left all their property when they died.
She lived with them for nineteen years, and yet the court refused to
grant specific performance, as she was never in possession. An even stronger
case is Devinney v. Corey, 52 Hun. 612, 5 N. Y. S. 289, affirmed in 127
N. Y. 655, 28 N. E. 254 (189), where plaintiff and her husband went to
live with her parents to help and care for them, in return for which the
father promised to convey his land to plaintiff. The court held there was
no such performance as would take the case out of the statute. The leading English case, Maddison Y. Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467 (Eng. 1883),
is in accord with these cases, and is cited with approval in Ellis v. Cary,
74 Wis. i76, 42 N. W. 252 (1889).
The principal case follows the doctrine laid down in Minnesota in the
case of Svanburg v. Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350, 78 N. W. 4 (i889), which is
in accord with the majority rule stated above, but the Minnesota cases
are very insistent that the acts claimed as performance must be done in
reliance on the contract. Stellmacher v. Bruder, 89 Minn. 507, 95 N. W.
324 (1903); Kins v. Ginzky, 135 Minn. 327, i6o N. W. 8 (1917).
SURETYSHIP-PART.UL

DIscHARGE

op

OBLIGATION-StBROGATION.-Sec-

tion 3466 Revised Satutes gives the United States priority over other
creditors. Section 3468 provides that when a surety pays to the United
States the debt of an insolvent principal he shall have "a like priority."
The National Surety Company was surety to the extent of $315o on a
debt of $r3,oo due the United States. On being forced to pay its guaranty
it claimed the right to prove for that amount against the insolvent estate of
the principal debtor on an equality with the United States. Held: The surety
company is not entitled to prove equally with the United States. United States
v. The National Surety Company, 41 Sup. Ct. 29 (192o).
The general rule is that where a surety has discharged the obligation
of the principal, he has the right and equity to be subrogated to thde
rights of the creditor with respect to any security which he holds against
the principal. Liles v. Rogers, 113 N. C. 197, 18 S. . 1o4 (i893); Brown
v. Rouse, 125 Cal. 645, 58 Pac. 267 (j899); Colt v. Sears Commercial Company, 20 R. I. 64, 37 Atl. 311 (1897). However, by the majority" rule subrogation is not allowed to work loss or injury to a lien or preferred
creditor whose claim has not been wholly discharged, although the surety
may have paid in full his obligation for part of it. National Bank v.
Rockefeller, i74 Fed. 22 (rgog); Child v. New York & New England R.
R. Co., 129 Mass. 17o (iSo); Knaffel v. Banking Company, 133 Tenn. 65,
179 S. W. 629 (igS); Ex parte Rushforth,- io Vesey Jr. 4og (i8o5). If
a surety, in making partial payment, should became entitled to subrogation
pro tanto, it would operate to place such surety upon a footing of
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equality with the holders of the unpaid part of the debt and in case the
property were insufficient to pay the remainder of the debt, the loss would
then fall proportionately on creditor and surety. The courts hold that it
would be inequitable for a surety, who has guaranteed part of the debt
thus to prevent the creditor from getting full satisfaction of his claim.
Gilsiam v. Esselman, 5 Sneed 86 (Tenn. 1857); Columbia v. Ky. Union R.
R. Co., 6o Fed. 794 (1894). Contra: Allison v. Sutherfin, So Mo. 274

(1872).
In the principal case the court took the position that section 3468 was
a statutory declaration of the equity doctrine of subrogation. Therefore,
since the surety had paid only part of the debt it would not be entitled
to be subrogated to the rights of the United States to the extent of
$3r5o and come in for a pro rata distribution of the assets. In arriving at
this conclusion the court reversed the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals (262 Fed. 62) where the court interpreted section 3468 strictly
and said the language plainly said that the surety should have "like
priority" upon paying the debt to the United States, which could" only
mean that with respect to any payment made, the surety should have the
right pro tanto to stand in the place of the United States and go against
the debtor on that claim.
T6RTS-DAMAGES-MENTAL

ANGsH.-The plaintiff

suffered mental

anxiety and distress upon learning through her physician that the accident
had so injured her heart as to make an urgent operation for a malignant
disease impossible of success. Iteld:. The metntal anguish was the proximate
result of her injury and a proper element of recoverable damages. Halloran v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1i5 Atl. 143 (Vt. i92i).
The strict rule as to mental anguish is that it must be the direct
result or accompaniment of the physical injury suffered by the plaintiff,
in order to constitute an element of damage. Bovee v. Danville, 53 Vt.
183 (i88o); Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Anderson, i82 Ill. 298, 55 N. E. 366
(i8gg); Thompson on Negligence, Vol. 6, sec. 732o.
Anxiety over a possible future impairment of health, nevertheless, has
been allowed by some courts as an element of damage. Thus mental anguish -caused by the fear of hydrophobia from the bite of a. dog has
been held to be recoverable in damages, Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 25r,
0i88o); Warner v. Chamberlain, 7 Iloust. x8, 30 AtL 638 (DeL 1884);
likewise with the apprehension of blood poisoning from bodily wounds,
Butts v. National Exch. Bank, 99 Mo. App. i68, 72 S. W. 1083 (1903);
Southern Kansas R. Co. v. McSwain, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 317, x18 S. W. 874

(xgog); and the fear of insanity from partial mental disability, Walker
v. Boston & M. R. Co., 71 N. H. 271, 51 AtL 98 (xgo2).
It is upon the authority of the class of cases just cited that the
court in the principal case allows the plaintiff's mental anguish as an
element of damage. The apprehension in the principal case, however, can
hardly be said to be that of future injury; the mental anxiety is rather the
worry over continued ill health, which possibly might not have continued
had the injury not prevented an available cure. There are no cases, it
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seems, where recovery for this type of mental anguish has been allowed,
and it appears that no cases have arisen wherein a situation at all similar
has been involved.
Although the court in the principal case may be correct in holding
the anxiety to be the natural and proximate result of the physical injury,
it is submitted that it is not as proximate or direct a result as in the
cases of fear of hydrophobia,,insanity and blood poisoning upon which the
court bases its decision. In those cases the apprehension directly and
almost automatically followed the injury, whereas in the principal case
the anxiety did not arise until the physician had told the plaintiff that
the operation was impossible because of the injury to her heart.
The courts have ben increasingly liberal in allowing recovery for
mental anguish, even where it is not strictly the direct and immediate result
of the injury; as in the cases where the plaintiff worried over the future
impairment of his earning capacity which the injury may have caused.
Citizens R. Co. v. Braham, 131 S. W. 403, (Tex. igii) ;Eagan v. Middlesex,
etc., R. Co., 212 Fed. 562, i3i C. C. 53 (1913); Ryan v. Oakland Gas, etc.,
Co., 21 Cal. App. 14, 12o Pac. 693 (913).
The principal case evidently shows the Vermont court's liberality in
this general direction and although it widens the application of mental
anguish as an element of damage, it seems nevertheless to be a sound and.
just extension.
TRUSTS-CHANCELLOR Wn.L NOT APPRIov INVESTMENT BEFORE MADE.Under Rev. Code of Delaware, 1915, sec. 3875, providing that a trustee
may invest in certain kinds of securities and "such other securities as may
be approved by the Chancellor," the petitioner, trustee for an insane person, sought the Chancellor's approval in advance of an investment in a.
personal security not authorized by the statute. Held: Petition denied.
The Chancellor will not approve an investment in advance. In re Conwell,
115 At. 3o9 (DeL CL 1921).
In the absence of a statute, the trustee has the privilege of seeking in
advance the approval of the court when he is in doubt as to the mode of
investment. Wheeler v. Perry, 18 N. H. 3o7, (1846); Bryant v. Craig, 12
Ala. 354 (.847); Snelling v. McCreary, 14 Rich. Eq. 291 (S. C. I8o8). in
England the same rule obtains. But there the equity courts have uniformly held that they would approve of real estate securities and securities of the British Government only. Neale v. Davis, s De Gex. M. & G.
258 (Eng. 1854) ; Ex parle Gleaves, 8 De Gex. M. & G. 291 (Eng. 1856).
Where statutes similar to the one in question have been passed, they
have been construed to require the court, on the petition of the guardian
or trustee, to approve or disapprove a proposed investment in advance.'
For example: Ga. Code (1873), Sec. 233o directing that trust funds may
be invested in "stocks, bonds, or other securities issued by this state
. Any other investment must be made under an order of
S
.
.
.
.," Ricks v. Broyles, 78 Ga. 6io, 3 S. E.
the Superior Court
772 (1887); Pa. Act of June 13. 1836 (P. L. 599), Sec. 34, providing that
the committee of an insane person is personally liable for loss incurred by
investment in securities other than real or governmental or those approved
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by the court of common pleas, Hemphill's Appeal, 18 Pa. 303 (1852); COMmonwealth cx rel v. McConnell, 220 Pa. 244, 75 Atl. 367 (r91o); Ohio, 1
Rev. St. (i89o), Sec. 6413, providing that trustees "may invest trust funds
in certificates of this state or of the United Siates or in such other securities as may be approved by the court." Willis v. Brancher, 79 Ohio St.
290 (o9).
The principal case is not only contra to the weight of authority but
also coira to the decisions of the same court before the statute in the
cases of In re Bellah, 8 Del. Ch. 59, 67 AtI. 273 (896), and In re Baker,
8 Del: Ch. 355 (1899). The statute being a codification of the previously
existing law, it is difficult to see why the Chancellor did not feel himself
bound by it.
VENDOR AND PURcHASER-SALE OF LAND--DEsTRucrioN

OF BUItDINGS BY

FIRE.-Between the time of making the contract and the time fixed for the
conveyance a building on the land still in the vendor's possession burned
down. Held: The vendee must bear the loss. McGinley v. Forrest, x8d
N. V. 74 (Neb. 1921).
The question as to who must bear the loss through destruction of
real estate between the making of the contract and the conveyance is one
upon which there is a decided difference of opinion. The rule that the venaee
must bear the loss is generally known as the majority rule and from the
time of Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. 349, 3i Eng. Rep. . io88 (18oi), when
it was first announced down to the present has been usually followed.
Reed v. Lukens, 4t Pa. 20o, 84 AtI. 425 (1863); Woodward v. McCollum, x6
N. D. 42, 11 N. IV. 623 (I9o7); Felt v. Morse, 85 So. 656 (Fla. 192o);
Mahan v. Home Ins. Co. 226 S. W. 593 (Mo. i92o). The reasoning in
favor of this rule is that the vendee by the contract becomes the equitable
owner and so as real owner must bear the loss. Pomeroy on Equitable
Remedies, Vol. 2, sec. 228& (2d ed. i919).
The contrary view holds that the vendor being unable to perform his
contract -must bear the loss. Gould v. Murch, %0 Me. 288, 35 At. 325
(1879); Powell v. Dayton, etc., R. R. Co., 12 Or. 488, 8 Pac. 544 (1885);
Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 22r, 128 N. E. 13 (1920).
However, there is another rule which was relied upon in the dissenting
opinion in the principal case. This rule puts the loss on the vendee only
if he is in possession and it is followed by the California courts especially,
liigbie & Higbie v. Shields, 2o Cal. App. Dec. 9o2, 15o Pac. 8oz (iIS);
and approved of in other jurisdictions. Good v. Jarrard, 93 S. C. =29, 76
S. E. 698 (1912); Elmore v. Stephens-Russell Co., 88 Or. 5o, i71 Pac.
763 (918); Boehm v. Platt, 189 N. Y. S. 16 (i92); Williston, 9 Harv.
L Rev. 122 (1895).
The majority of the court in the principal case has seen fit to follow
the doctrine which puts the loss on the vendee even though the vendor is in
possession This view can be logically supported; but it seems that there
would be more justice and a closer adherence to what the parties actually
had in mind at the making of the contract if the intermediate view were
followed. The vendee should not be held responsible for destruction
before the land has been put under his control by possession.

